Hamas - Portrait of a Terrorist Organization

[Nannette]

For photos and diagrams click link at end of article...

Hamas –the Islamic Resistance Movement

Background information and ideology

1. Hamas was founded in 1987 with the beginning of the first violent Palestinian insurrection against Israel ( intifada ), in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank. Its founding reflected the Islamic trend headed by Ahmad Yassin, which rejected focusing exclusively on the da'wah , (the Muslim Brotherhood ideology of changing society through preaching, indoctrination and education), and added Palestinian nationalism. At the top of its priority list, Hamas put the eradication of the State of Israel through the use of terrorist strategy and tactics .

2. Hamas ideology states that the Palestinian problem is religious and therefore can never be solved by political compromise, and that the land of Palestine, “from the river to the sea,” is consecrated to Islam ( wakf ). It cannot be given up, not even a part of it, especially not Jerusalem .

3. Thus Hamas is utterly opposed to a political settlement with Israel. It has opposed any agreements the Palestinian Authority (PA)/PLO reached with Israel, particularly the Oslo accords. That is also the reason it refuses to recognize the authority of the PA. Hamas rejects the idea of joining it, and will do so only when the PA has cancelled all its political obligations and agreed to a new orientation and source of authority.

4. The perpetration of terrorist acts against Israel is central to its ideology : as long as Palestinians live under the “occupation” ( including within Israel ) they must “resist” through jihad (holy war, by which they mean an armed insurrection against the State of Israel) . However, Hamas also realizes the necessity (with religious rationale as well) of reaching temporary tactical cease fires ( hudnas ) to avoid coming into open conflict with the PA (and international and regional elements), which might hurt its standing with the Palestinian public.

The Hamas Leadership

5. The Hamas founder and leader was Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who was eliminated by Israel in a targeted killing on March 22, 2004. Its current leader is the chairman of its Political Office, Khaled Mash'al , who has held that position since 1996 and resides and is active in Damascus . His second-in-command, also residing in Damascus, is Mousa Muhammad Muhammad Abu Marzouk , for whose arrest the United States issued a warrant (August 20, 2004) for financing and supporting terrorism.

6. There are two centers of leadership: the “ external ” and the “ internal .” The external is composed of Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood followers who studied abroad (primarily in the Gulf States) and joined Hamas, and leaders who were expelled from the PA-administered territories. It is located in Syria (whence it went after being expelled from Jordan in 1999), but it has representatives in various Arab countries, e.g., Lebanon.

7. The “internal” leadership is located in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israeli prisons. Its most prominent members are :

a. Ismail Hania, high-ranking Hamas member in the Gaza Strip for many years, formerly the head of Ahmad Yassin's office.

b. Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of the movement's founders, imprisoned by both Israel and the PA. Apparently appointed as second-in-command to ‘Abd al-Aziz Rantisi after Ahmad Yassin's death.

c. Nizar Rian, a lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza, formerly a senior member of the Liberation Party (an extremist Islamic party also operating in the PA-administered territories).

d. Sa'id Siam, a preacher and teacher, high-ranking leader in the Gaza Strip. He serves as a Hamas representative at forums in which other groups participate (the Islamic and National Forces).

e. Sami Abu Zahari, a rising star among the younger generation of leaders, formerly highly paced in the Hamas student movement (the Islamic Block), today a lecturer at the Islamic University.

8. Hamas policy decisions are arrived at though a dialogue of the various leaderships, although today (September 2004) the “external ” leadership (influenced and supported by Syria and Iran) has more weight than the “internal.” Because of its proximity to those two countries, its position is relatively extreme and inflexible .

The Hamas operational-terrorist infrastructures

9. Hamas has operational-terrorist infrastructures (the Izzedine al-Qassam Battalions) in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and logistic support infrastructures outside of the PA-administered territories. Most of its operatives in the West Bank are directed by the “external” leadership and have been responsible for most of the suicide bombing attacks within Israel since the beginning of the current on-going violent insurrection . However, the focus and leadership of Hamas' operational-terrorist infrastructures are in the Gaza Strip , where it has even founded a militia called the Popular Army.

10. For a list of the more deadly terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas against the Israeli civilian population, see the Appendix . Prominent among them were the suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya (March 2002), which led to Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and the suicide bombing attack on the No. 2 bus in Jerusalem (August 2003), which ended the temporary cease fire ( hudna ).

The Hamas civilian infrastructures

11. In addition to its operational-terrorist infrastructures, Hamas has a broad range of civilian infrastructures called the da'wah . They complement and support the former: its mosques and university student movements are hothouses for future suicide bombers; a portion of the funds collected by its “charitable societies” for the needy are channeled to the families of shaheeds , prisoners and those wanted by Israel; some of the funds trickle down to the operational-terrorist wing; and it provides employment for high-ranking Hamas operatives in its “charitable societies” and other institutions.

12. Hamas also supports a wide range of “educational” activities in the PA-administered territories (kindergartens, schools, summer camps, clubhouses) which are in de facto competition with those of the PA . In its alternative educational system, the younger generations are indoctrinated with the tenets of extreme religious Islam and are incited to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Israel. The inspiration sometimes comes from extremist Islamic preachers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries.

13. Hamas has vast financial resources (estimated at tens of millions of dollars annually ). The money is supplied mostly by various funds and institutions in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Western Europe, and from other, secondary sources. That enables Hamas to invest some of the money in Palestinian welfare (which is harmed by its terrorist attacks) and to purchase sympathy from some of the population (which suffers from the attacks but enjoys the payments).

14. Hamas is the Palestinian Authority's chief source of opposition and systematically undermines its authority, prestige and political influence. The Palestinian Authority takes no effective steps against it and certainly does nothing to dismantle its terrorist infrastructures. During the current ongoing violent confrontation the PA has acted against Hamas a number of times, but its attempts were ineffective and short lived because Arafat does not want a showdown with Hamas and is interested in the continuation of the violent confrontation with Israel .

It is impossible to separate the operational-terrorist and political-propaganda wings of Hamas or to make any distinction between them

15. One of the claims providing a kind of immunity for Hamas leadership is that its military and political wings are “separate.” The claim is false , however, since no clear line can be drawn between the two. The senior “political” leaders are deeply involved in directing all Hamas' activities:

a. Deciding and directing operational policy and the authorization of terrorist attacks against Israel : The leaders are involved in decisions regarding both the types of attacks to be perpetrated (such as suicide bombing attacks and the launching of Qassam missiles) and when and where to perpetrate them.

b. Direct guidance of the heads of terrorist groups : Some high-ranking Hamas activists are involved in the organizational issues of the operational-terrorist wing.

c. Generating public consciousness: Public consciousness within Palestinian society in general and among Hamas activities in particular is heightened regarding the use of terrorism (including the perpetration of suicide bombing attacks against civilians), accomplished through indoctrination and the distribution of propaganda. They also have a well-oiled “educational” system, which raises generations of Palestinians (from kindergarten to university) on negating the existence of the State of Israel, jihad , and hatred of Jews wherever they are found (Hamas propaganda is rife with Islamic anti-Semitism).

d. Fundraising in the Arab countries and Western Europe : The money is transferred to the organization's civilian wing which, as noted, supports its terrorist infrastructures and undermines the status of the Palestinian Authority (infuriating the PA, which in the past appealed to Saudi Arabia with regard to Saudi financial contributions to Hamas). Some of it trickles down into the terrorism-supporting apparatus and Hamas' operational-terrorist wing.

e. Coordination with other terrorist organizations and countries which sponsor terrorism : High-ranking Hamas operatives in the PA-administered territories maintain close contact with Iran and Syria (part of American president George W. Bush's evil axis ) and with other terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah. The Hamas leaders are responsible for acquiring their political, military and economic support.

Hamas activities outside the PA-administered territories

16. Today Syria is Hamas' main political, propaganda and operational arena. The leaders – especially members of the Political Office – both live there and direct the organization's activities. The activities are run by Khaled Mash'al and members of the operational headquarters.

17. The Syrian régime supports the Palestinian terrorist organizations and allows the Hamas leadership and its operational headquarters to conduct their activities from Syrian soil . Such activities include deciding operational policy, the active direction of terrorist attacks against Israel, training terrorists, financing the organizing of terrorist elements in the PA-administered territories and providing assistance in purchasing weapons. Reacting to American pressure, Syria occasionally takes steps to make its support less visible, but in effect nothing has changed in the way Hamas (and other terrorist organizations) conduct their affairs in Syria , and they continue their activities without intervention or disturbance.

18. Hamas is active in other countries as well, principally Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan , which also provide financial support and training camps. Saudi Arabia is the source of much of the radical religious Islamic material distributed by Hamas in the PA-administered territories, which serves its “educational” and indoctrinational needs.

19. It is worthwhile noting that Hamas is also active in European countries . Its activities there are oriented toward indoctrination and propaganda (its organ Filisteen Al-Muslima is distributed from London ) and raising money to finance its civilian infrastructures in the PA-administered territories.

Appendix

Some of the more prominent Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel were:

1. The kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldiers Avi Sasportas (February 16, 1989), Ilan Sa'adon (May 3, 1989) and Nissim Toledano (December 13, 1992).

2. The kidnapping of Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman (October 9-14, 1994). Wachsman and another soldier, Nir Poraz, were killed.

3. A suicide bombing attack on the No. 5 bus in Tel Aviv (October 19, 1994); 22 killed.

4. Two suicide bombing attacks on No. 18 buses in Jerusalem (February 25 and March 3, 1996); 47 killed.

5. A suicide bombing attack at the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv (June 1, 2001); 21 killed.

6. A suicide bombing attack at the Sbarro Restaurant in Jerusalem (August 9, 2001); 15 killed.

7. A suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya during the Passover Seder (March 27, 2002); 30 killed. The attack led to Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002).

8. A suicide bombing attack in Rishon Letzion (May 7, 2002); 16 killed.

9. A suicide bombing attack at the Pat intersection in Jerusalem (June 18, 2002); 19 killed.

10. A suicide bombing attack on a No. 2 bus in Jerusalem (August 19, 2003); 23 killed. The attack ended the
temporary cease fire ( hudna ).

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/9_04/hamas.htm
_________________
He who is merciful with the cruel, will end-up being cruel to the merciful
- Kohelet Rabba 7:16